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D
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF NAVIES AND COAST GUARDS IN 
MARITIME SECURITY 
 
 
       s a concept maritime security may encompass, and blur demarcations 
between, a range of traditional threats (military or strategic) and threats from 
non-traditional actors.1 Threats to national security in the maritime domain 
may include “terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime  . . . pi-
racy, environmental/resource destruction, and illegal seaborne immigra-
tion.”2 The challenge that follows is that navies across the globe are increas-
ingly called upon to carry our maritime security and even law enforcement 
roles going beyond traditional warfighting capabilities. 3 Indeed, as Till has 
noted, as the concept of maritime security widens, “the extent of potential 
overlap” between naval and coast guard activities “is increasing in ways 
which raise issues over who should be responsible for what.”4 Thus, in an 
age of maritime security, actionable law enforcement intelligence is no longer 
an issue for coast guards alone; it is increasingly an issue for navies as well. 
There are a number of obvious virtues in maintaining distinct naval and 
coast guard forces: pragmatically, “lawships” need different tools and capa-
bilities than warships, and conventional “gray painted” naval vessels are 
sometimes ill-suited to perform law enforcement tasks.5 This is most appar-
ent in the standards applied to the use of force in differing operations. In 
general, the military is entitled to use deadly force to overcome “the enemy ,” 
but police forces do not have “enemies” and are generally required to remain 
                                                                                                                      
1. Christian Bueger, What is Maritime Security? 53 MARINE POLICY 159 (2015); Dirk C. Son-
nenberg, Maritime Law Enforcement: A Critical Capability for the Navy? 1–3 (Mar. 2012) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle 
/10945/6873. 
2. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, CHIEF 
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD, NAVAL OPERATIONS 
CONCEPT 2010: IMPLEMENTING THE MARITIME STRATEGY 35 (2010),  https://www.uscg 
.mil/history/docs/2010NOC.pdf. 
3. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 5. 
4. GEOFFREY TILL, SEAPOWER: A GUIDE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 302 (2004). 
5. Sam Bateman, Regional Navies and Coast Guards: Striking a Balance between “Lawships” and 
Warships, in NAVAL MODERNISATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA: NATURE, CAUSES AND CON-
SEQUENCES 245, 246–47 (Geoffrey Till & Jane Chan eds., 2014); see also Andrew Murdoch 
& Douglas Guilfoyle, Capture and Disruption Operations: The Use of  Force in Counter-Piracy off  
Somalia, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 147, 167–68 (Douglas 
Guilfoyle ed., 2013). 
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within the bounds of reasonable and proportionate force in subduing sus-
pects who are often fellow citizens.6 There is also a difference in mindset 
between military and law enforcement operations, with the former typically 
prioritizing “disrupting or stopping the threat . . . over long-term solutions, 
and intelligence exploitation . . . over evidence collection and [creating] case 
packages.”7 
However, not every coastal State has the luxury of maintaining separate 
maritime services.8 Even in the United States where there is a policy division 
between maritime defense and security issues (with the Department of De-
fense and Coast Guard as the respective lead agencies) there are areas of 
overlap in which certain maritime threats can be classified as both homeland 
defense and national security issues. This overlap may create policy chal-
lenges.9 While the United States is perhaps unique in the impediments of law 
and tradition that restrict the use of naval assets in law enforcement opera-
tions,10 there are nonetheless practical limitations that may restrict the effec-
tiveness of, for example, European navies in conducting constabulary tasks. 11 
In reality, most successful maritime law enforcement operations, irrespective 
of the force conducting them, require both a combination of actionable in-
telligence and interagency (or international) cooperation based on some de-
gree of intelligence sharing.12  
The need for intelligence is also a consequence of limited resources. Ef-
fective maritime law enforcement requires choices to be made about the de-
ployment of finite assets. Even when maritime patrols are conducted in or-
der to “randomly” intercept crimes such as human or drug smuggling, where 
such patrols occur is itself based on intelligence. Even the most well -re-
sourced navies and coast guards cannot maintain a “cordon of steel” around 
a national coastline. There is the now well-known story of a U.S. Secretary 
of State, startled at the arrival of 220 maritime irregular migrants in Miami, 
                                                                                                                      
6. Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 
88 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1795, 1821 (2010); see also Håkan Friman & Jens Lindborg, Initiating 
Criminal Proceedings with Military Force: Some Legal Aspects of  Policing Somali Pirates by Navies , in 
MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 172. 
7. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 70. 
8. Nong Hong, China’s Newly Formed Coast Guard and Its Implication for Regional Maritime Dis-
putes, 28 OCEAN YEARBOOK 611, 618 (2014). 
9. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 4. 
10. Id. 
11. Friman & Lindborg, supra note 6; Douglas Guilfoyle, Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and 
Human Rights, 59 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 141 (2010). 
12. Sonnenberg supra note 1, at 52. 
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demanding to know: “How in the world did they get through?” The answer 
from the U.S. Coast Guard Commandant was, of course: “Sir, with all due 
respect, how did they get through what?”13 In intercepting threats in the mar-
itime domain, intelligence will always be crucial whether the mission is one 
of national defense or of law enforcement. 
 
II.  LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND ACTIONABLE INTELLI-
GENCE 
 
A. Maritime Domain Awareness as a Form of Intelligence 
 
The first step in considering the role of intelligence in maritime security law 
enforcement operations is, obviously enough, to consider what is meant by 
intelligence. Here, Colby’s observations remain helpful:  
 
There are no limits to the types and sources of information which may be 
useful. The processing of intelligence refers to the treatment accorded the 
raw data which has been collected. It generally includes appraisal of the 
relevance of the information, as well as editing and cataloguing in forms 
useful to decision-makers. These tasks vary enormously in complexity, de-
pending in large measure on the amount and quality of data requested and 
actually collected.14 
 
One topic considered in passing in this article will be the sharing of in-
formation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, 
while such information may—and sometimes does—play a role in real cases 
where maritime law enforcement action is taken, it is obviously not the only 
or even necessarily the best source of actionable intelligence in maritime law 
enforcement. A critical concept remains maritime domain awareness 
(MDA). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) definition of MDA 
is “[t]he effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime 
                                                                                                                      
13. Joseph L. Nimmich & Dana A. Goward, Maritime Domain Awareness: The Key to Maritime 
Security, in GLOBAL LEGAL CHALLENGES: COMMAND OF THE COMMONS, STRATEGIC COM-
MUNICATIONS AND NATURAL DISASTERS 57 (Michael D. Carsten ed., 2007). 
14. Jonathan E. Colby, The Developing International Law on Gathering and Sharing Security Intelli-
gence, 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 49, 53 (1974) (quoted in NATALIE KLEIN, 
MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 211 (2012)). 
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environment that could impact upon . . . security, safety, economy or [the] 
environment.”15 
This definition appears to draw heavily on the wording of the 2004 U.S. 
Maritime Security Policy directive.16 While MDA is originally a U.S. concept, 
Australia, Canada, the European Union and the Philippines (among others) 
all have MDA policies.17 MDA is basically about knowing who is doing what, 
where. A simple example is provided by Seychelles efforts to secure their 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (formidably large compared to their land 
territory) against piracy. By fitting all Seychellois fishing vessels with auto-
matic identification systems, and improving radar coverage across their 
EEZ, the Seychellois Coast Guard was able to identify vessels in its EEZ 
that were not Seychellois fishing vessels and send one of its limited number 
of cutters to investigate and verify that the vessel was not a threat.18 How-
ever, MDA is not always this simple.19 
 
B. Intelligence Sharing: Problems of National Law and Agency Coordination 
 
In the U.S. context, various impediments have made the sharing of infor-
mation gathered by military or intelligence agencies with law enforcement 
especially challenging. Nonetheless, the basic problems relating to the use of 
intelligence agency products in law enforcement are relatively common to a 
number of jurisdictions. As Vervaele notes: 
 
                                                                                                                      
15. International Maritime Organization, MSC.1/Circ. 1415, Amendments to the Interna-
tional Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual 11 (May 25, 2012),  
http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/msnote/pdf/msin1242anx1.pdf. 
16. President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Home-
land Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13, at 5 (Dec. 21, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/off-
docs/nspd/nspd41.pdf. 
17. See Transport Canada, Maritime Domain Awareness, CANADA.CA, http://www.tc.gc.ca/  
eng/marinesecurity/initiatives-235.htm (last visited July 19, 2017); Commission Communica-
tion, Towards the Integration of  Maritime Surveillance: A Common Information Sharing Environment for 
the EU Maritime Domain, COM (2009) 538 final (Oct. 15, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0538&from=EN; ANGEL RABASA & 
PETER CHALK, NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS IN 
THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE COAST WATCH SYSTEM OF THE PHIL-
IPPINES 21 (2012). Australia is discussed below. 
18. The author observed this system on a visit to the Seychelles Coast Guard headquarters  
in 2011. 
19. See inf ra Part III. 
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That such information can be used as a lead for initiating criminal investi-
gations is hardly contested. Much more of a problem is, however, whether 
this information per se is able to give rise to reasonable suspicion or form 
a sufficient basis for the use of coercive measures under criminal law . . . 
[or] can be used as legal proof in criminal proceedings.20 
 
There is also the risk that if law enforcement agencies are allowed rou-
tinely to use information derived from intelligence agency surveillance (usu-
ally conducted under more permissive standards than those required of law 
enforcement) a situation may evolve where ordinary restraints on law en-
forcement surveillance are circumvented through surveillance activities be-
ing de facto “outsourced” to intelligence agencies.21 U.S. discussion of this 
question has centered on the role of intelligence gathered under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA prohibited direct sharing of intel-
ligence gathered under the Act with law enforcement agencies, and re-
quired—in addition to certain statutory requirements—the permission of the 
Attorney General for such sharing to take place in a particular case. 22 The 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 substantially reformed the law concerning in-
formation sharing between defense, intelligence and law enforcement agen-
cies to facilitate, inter alia, efforts to combat crimes of terrorism. The princi-
pal reform was a change to FISA introduced by section 218 of the Act, under 
which FISA investigatory powers could be used if “a significant purpose” of 
surveillance was the collection of foreign intelligence information (as op-
posed to the previous standard of “primary purpose”). 23 This change was 
intended to more readily allow, for example, a wiretap to proceed not only 
if the purposes of intercepts was to “turn a suspected spy into a double agent 
(a classic counterespionage technique), but also to prosecute that spy for es-
pionage (the textbook law enforcement move).”24 
While changes to FISA may have loosened some rules-based restrictions 
around interagency intelligence sharing, they have not necessarily removed 
                                                                                                                      
20. John A. E. Vervaele, Terrorism and Information Sharing between the Intelligence and Law Enforce-
ment Communities in the US and the Netherlands: Emergency  Criminal Law?, 1 UTRECHT LAW RE-
VIEW 1, 2 (2005). 
21. Sales, supra note 6, at 1810–11. 
22. Vervaele, supra note 20, at 6–7; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 §§ 106, 305 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806, 1825 (2012)). 
23. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272 (1971) (codified  
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2012)). 
24. Sales, supra note 6, at 1812. 
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all possible firewalls. Principal remaining barriers include the National Secu-
rity Act 1947, which continues to place a broad and ambiguously worded 
prohibition on the Central Intelligence Agency’s exercising any “police, sub-
poena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions,”25 and es-
pecially the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which makes it an offense for 
anyone to use “any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus 
or otherwise to execute the laws” of the United States (except as otherwise 
authorized by the Constitution or statute).26 As a matter of policy, the general 
prohibition on law execution by military forces has been extended to the 
U.S. Navy, despite an express textual reference authorizing these activities in 
the Act.27 As Sales notes, “it remains unclear to what extent Posse Comitatus 
allows law enforcement officials and military officers to share information 
with one another. Indeed, in part because of the Act, military brass appear 
to be exceedingly reluctant to share information with their colleagues in law 
enforcement agencies.”28 
While these are obviously U.S.-specific problems, they highlight the kind 
of difficulties that may and do exist in other jurisdictions, as well as where 
multiple government agencies have had traditionally distinct functions and 
legislative mandates, but that are now expected to cooperate to deliver 
greater maritime security. In Australia, for example, it was once estimated 
that, in addition to responsibility “for securing Australia’s maritime ap-
proaches [being] spread widely between agencies of both [the federal Com-
monwealth government and the states],” that “about twelve Commonwealth 
agencies” have some involvement in questions of maritime security. 29 While 
the creation of the Australian Border Force (ABF) in 2015 might be thought 
to have simplified the situation (Australia’s border being entirely maritime), 
the ABF notes that it “regularly engages with partner agencies,”30 including 
the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Antarctic Division, the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority, the Australian Crime 
                                                                                                                      
25. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-523, § 102 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 3036(d)(1) (2012)). 
26. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012). 
27. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD Dir. 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law 
Enforcement Officials ¶ E4.3 (1986). 
28. Sales, supra note 6, at 1824. 
29. Sam Bateman, Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches, 3 SECURITY CHALLENGES 109,  
117 (2007). 
30. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTEC-
TION, AUSTRALIAN BORDER FORCE, PROTECTING OUR BORDERS, https://www.bor-
der.gov.au/australian-border-force-abf/protecting (last visited July 19, 2017). 
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Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Fisheries Manage-
ment Authority, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the Australian Se-
curity Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of De-
fence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of In-
dustry and Science, the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Devel-
opment, the Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Office of 
Transport Security, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the 
Department of Environment and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Au-
thority. The use of the word “including” to introduce a non-exhaustive list 
of eighteen partner agencies is telling as to the complexities involved. 
This type and level of complexity resulted in the U.S. adoption in 2005 
of the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan to better coor-
dinate the interagency response to particular maritime security operations. 31 
Since that time, “the MOTR Plan has been successfully employed for hun-
dreds of routine maritime threats and a number of low-frequency/high risk 
threats. These cases include drug and migrant interdiction, fisheries viola-
tions, bomb threats, radiation/nuclear alarm resolution, and piracy.”32 At 
least ten States have similarly adopted “whole-of-government processes to 
improve the interagency response to [maritime] threats” to deal with such 
challenges of information sharing and coordinated action. 33 
 
III. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
While MDA is a simple enough concept, delivering it in a manner consistent 
with international law is not free from difficulty. First, there may be ques-
tions regarding the intelligence uses to which information gathered in mari-
time law enforcement operations may be put. Second, States may desire in-
formation about vessels transiting off their coasts that they have no obvious 
                                                                                                                      
31. Brian Wilson, Reshaping Maritime Security Cooperation: The Importance of  Interagency Coordina-
tion at the National Level, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra 
note 5, at 202. 
32. Gary L. Tomasulo Jr., Evolution of Interagency Cooperation in the United States Gov-
ernment: The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan 3 (June 2010) (unpublished 
M.B.A. thesis, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/59157/659552377-MIT.pdf?se-
quence=2. 
33. Brian Wilson, Five Maritime Security Developments That Will Resonate for a Generation , HAR-
VARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL (Mar. 11, 2015), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/04/Wilson-NSJ-Article-PDF.pdf. 
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power to demand under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS) absent further international cooperative mechanisms being estab-
lished.34 As a key example of the latter, in 2004 Australia declared its inten-
tion to create a 1,000 nautical mile (nm) “Maritime Information Zone” 
within which it proposed that any passing vessel would be “required to pro-
vide details of cargo, destination, crew, port of call, [and] likely arrival [time] 
at port.”35 The Australian Prime Minister was further reported as saying the 
Defence Force “will be able to intercept and board ships and do ‘whatever 
it takes’ to get the information they need.”36 Though clearly able to make the 
provision of such information a condition of entry for vessels intending to 
enter an Australian port,37 Australia had no obvious authority to demand 
such information from vessels merely transiting within 1,000 nm, let alone 
intercept them using defense personnel to demand information. In addition, 
the Australian government declared an intention “to identify all vessels, 
other than day recreational boats” upon their entry to its EEZ.38 Within 
months protests from Indonesia and New Zealand saw Australia rebrand its 
initiative the “Australian Maritime Information System” and stress that in-
formation would be sought from shipping on “a wholly voluntary basis” un-
derpinned by “cooperative international arrangements.”39 
Unsurprisingly, Australia was already actively involved in efforts to es-
tablish a cooperative international system for greater exchange of shipping 
information at the IMO.40 In 2006 after four years of work, and in an initia-
tive largely spearheaded by the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
IMO Maritime Safety Committee reached agreement on a long-range iden-
tification and tracking (LRIT) system, to be implemented as Regulation 19-
1 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Its 
                                                                                                                      
34. The following section draws substantially on research previously published. See Douglas 
Guilfoyle, Maritime Security , in LAW OF THE SEA: UNCLOS AS A LIVING TREATY 329 (Jill 
Barrett & Richard Barnes eds., 2016). 
35. Catherine McGrath, Government Boosts Maritime Security , ABC (Dec. 15, 2004), http:// 
www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1266082.htm . 
36. Id. 
37. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 25(2), opened for signature Dec. 10,  
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
38. Natalie Klein, Legal Implications of  Australia’s Maritime Identif ication System, 55 INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 337, 337 (2006) (quoting Press Release,  
Prime Minister John Howard, Strengthening Offshore Maritime Security (Dec. 14, 2004)). 
39. NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 227 (2012). 
40. See, e.g., Australia, MSC 79/5/12, Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Long-Range 
Identification and Tracking of Ships (Sept. 24, 2004), http://merchantmarine.financelaw 
.fju.edu.tw/data/IMO/MSC/79/MSC%2079-5-12.pdf. 
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implementation under SOLAS obviously has the effect of making it binding 
on SOLAS State parties through the tacit acceptance procedure. 41 The regu-
lation entered into force in July 2009. The LRIT system’s essential features 
are as follows: 
 
 [V]essels covered by the regulation must automatically transmit every six 
hours the ship’s identity, position (expressed in latitude and longitude) 
and “the date and time of the position provided;”42 
 all covered vessels “must transmit . . . LRIT data to the data centre nom-
inated by its flag State” and the LRIT regulations “allow flag States to 
receive LRIT information from ships flying their flag” wherever they are 
worldwide43 and 
 contracting SOLAS governments must “elect either to create a National 
LRIT Data Centre, or participate in a Regional or Cooperative [LRIT] 
Data Centre.”44 
 
LRIT Data Centres may request information of each other through the 
International Data Exchange. Using this mechanism, port States are “enti-
tled to receive [LRIT] information about ships which have indicated their 
intention to enter a port facility . . . or a place under the jurisdiction of that 
[State], irrespective of where such ships [are] . . . provided they are not lo-
cated” within another SOLAS party’s internal waters.45 Correspondingly, a 
coastal State is “entitled to receive [LRIT] information about ships . . . navi-
gating within . . . 1,000 nautical miles of its coast provided such ships are not 
located” within another SOLAS party’s internal waters.46 
Thus, despite the skepticism with which the Australian Maritime Infor-
mation Zone proposal was initially received, the final LRIT system strongly 
resembles what Australia had proposed. Nor was Australia alone in seeking 
                                                                                                                      
41. JAMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 161–62 (2011). 
42. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 5.3, Nov. 1, 
1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 (2007 revision) [hereinafter SOLAS]. 
43. Chris Rahman, Maritime Domain Awareness in Australia and New Zealand, in MARITIME 
SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND 200, 211 (Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop & Donald R Rothwell eds., 2010). 
44. Id. at 210. 
45. SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 8.1. 
46. Id. 
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information about vessels transiting waters off its coasts. During IMO ne-
gotiations in 2005, the United States suggested coastal States should be able 
to request LRIT information about vessels within 2,000 nm of their coasts.47  
The following year, Norway suggested 1,200 nm.48 
Nor is the LRIT system effective only on paper. After some delays in its 
establishment (during which time the United States provided International 
Data Exchange services on an interim basis), the UN Secretary-General an-
nounced in 2012 that 
 
the International Data Exchange for the [LRIT] system is now in opera-
tion. As at [sic] 9 March 2012, 97 out of 161 parties to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea were part of the system and 66 
data centres for long-range identification and tracking of ships were con-
nected to the Exchange.49 
 
Nonetheless, as an MDA tool the LRIT system is far from perfect. It con-
tains rather “pedantic” restrictions on the ability to request information 
about ships present within another State party’s baselines.50 More problem-
atically, it permits flag States to opt out entirely from providing information 
where requests are made on security grounds.51 Another weakness of the 
system is that it applies only to passenger ships, cargo ships of at least 300 
gross tons and mobile offshore drilling units.52 It therefore does not apply to 
cargo ships under 300 tons nor to fishing vessels or small privately-owned 
recreational craft. It is precisely such small vessels that pose the greater se-
curity threat: “While safety, security, and stewardship regimes are increas-
ingly being developed for larger vessels on the sea, many smaller vessels, 
                                                                                                                      
47. United States, MSC 80/3/3, Long-range Identification and Tracking of Ships ¶ 5.3 (Nov. 
12, 2004). 
48. Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 81/25, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on 
its Eighty-First Session ¶ 5.84 (May 24, 2006). Note, however, the opposition of China to 
such information being sought of vessels not intending to call at a State’s port. See Maritime 
Safety Committee, MSC 81/25/Add.2, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 
Eighty-First Session annex 43 (June 1, 2006). 
49. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of  the Sea, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/67/79/Add.1 
(Aug. 31, 2012). 
50. Rahman, supra note 43, at 211 (referring to SOLAS Regulation 19-1, ¶ 8.1.2); see also 
SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 8.1.4 (flag States need not provide information 
about their own flag vessels present in their own territorial sea). 
51. SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 9.1; see also KLEIN, supra note 39, at 232. 
52. SOLAS, supra note 42, ch. 5, reg. 19-1, ¶ 2.1. 
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including most fishing vessels, tugs, and recreational vessels, are not covered 
by these regimes and remain largely anonymous.”53 
As the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has noted, “Small vessels 
are . . . readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contra-
band, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully em-
ployed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive 
Devices (WBIEDs).”54 Further, the scale of the challenge posed by small 
boats is immense, as the United States alone has “nearly 13 million registered 
. . . recreational vessels, 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial 
small vessels.”55 LRIT information will thus be of no use in relation to the 
frequent use of small boats for smuggling (especially of drugs and migrants)56 
and the increasing use of fishing vessels in transnational organized criminal 
activity.57 Terrorist organizations may also use small boats in attacks on land 
targets, as was the case for some of the terrorists involved in the 2008 Mum-
bai attacks.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
53. COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, THE U.S. COAST GUARD 
STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP 26 (2007), http:// 
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470382. 
54. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY, at i 
(2008), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=485572. 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
91, 194–95, 212 (2007). 
57. See generally EVE DE CONING, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY (2011), http:// 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/2011/issue-paper-transnational-organized-
crime-in-the-fishing-industry.html. 
58. Somini Sengupta & Keith Bradsher, Mumbai Terrorist Siege Over, India Says, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29mumbai. 
html. 
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IV. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURE (VBSS) OPERATIONS 
 
A. VBSS Operations on the High Seas 
 
Useful law enforcement intelligence can be gathered in the course of a VBSS 
operation.59 In particular, boarding a vessel suspected of one crime may re-
veal evidence of another crime. Thus, it was not uncommon for counter-
piracy patrols off Somalia during VBSS operations to find that hidden below 
decks aboard suspect vessels was not a crew of pirates, but a human cargo 
of irregular migrants seeking to be smuggled into Yemen.60 The frustrating 
result was that migrant smugglers were often let go because the counter-
piracy missions lacked a mandate to deal with migrant smuggling off the Af-
rican coast, even though some of the same navies were engaged in interdict-
ing migrant smugglers in the Mediterranean.61 
While this was ultimately a problem of mandate, not legal authority, it 
does raise the broader question of whether there are distinct legal limitations 
on what naval forces and maritime agencies can do with information gath-
ered in the course of VBSS operations. Unsurprisingly, the issue turns on the 
zone in which one operates. The high seas are for present purposes the most 
pertinent case (though other zones are discussed briefly below). 
In respect of the high seas, a controversy is provided by the extent of 
authority conferred under UNCLOS Article 110, which governs the conduct 
of VBSS operations in cases of reasonable suspicion that a vessel is engaged 
in piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting or is without nationality. 
Such an operation is intended to be conducted in sequence. Under Article 
110(3), a warship may “send a boat under the command of an officer to the 
suspected ship.” The boarding party is to first inspect the ship’s documents 
                                                                                                                      
59. For a very useful general overview of the law applicable to VBSS operations, see James 
Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of  Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure, 
16 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (2011), http://digitalcommons.maine-
law.maine.edu/oclj/vol16/iss1/2. 
60. See also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZED CRIME IN EASTERN AFRICA: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 3–4, 11–15 (2013), 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Af-
rica_2013.pdf; INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST, PI-
RACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT 22 (2008), http://www.imcsnet.org 
/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf. 
61. European Union Naval Force: Mediterranean Operation Sophia, EEAS (Sept. 15, 2016),  
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en_0.pdf. 
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to “verify the ship’s right to fly its flag.” Then, “[i]f suspicion remains . . . it 
may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be 
carried out with all possible consideration.” The question that arises is 
whether the information found in the course of such an “examination” is 
limited by the original purposes of the boarding. I shall call this question the 
“wider use” problem. 
The conventional view is that at least some forms of wider use are pro-
hibited.62 The foundational text relied upon to posit this view is normally the 
commentaries of the International Law Commission to the 1956 draft Arti-
cles on the Law of the Sea. With regard to the equivalent provision to Article 
110, the Commission stated: 
 
If the examination of the merchant ship’s papers does not allay the suspi-
cions [giving rise to the rights of boarding], a further examination may be 
made on board the ship. Such examination must in no circumstances be 
used for purposes other than those which warranted stopping the vessel. Hence the 
boarding party must be under the command of an officer responsible for 
the conduct of his men.63 
 
The same point is made in the highly regarded Virginia Commentary, 
which tracks closely to the language used by the Commission: 
 
If suspicion remains after examination of the ship’s papers, the boarding 
party may proceed to a further examination on board the ship. Such further 
examination is not to be used for purposes other than those which war-
ranted stopping the ship, and is to be carried out with all possible consid-
eration.64 
 
Given that international lawyers normally take the pronouncements of 
the International Law Commission as authoritative, how is this limitation to 
be construed? Wendel suggests a potentially broad construction.65 Consider 
                                                                                                                      
62. See inf ra notes 63 and 64. 
63. Report of  the International Law Commission to the General Assembly , 11 UN GAOR Supp. No. 
9, at 284, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l. L. Comm’n. 284 (com-
mentary to Article 46) (emphasis added). 
64. 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 
245 (Myron H. Nordquist, Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995). 
65. PHILIPP WENDEL, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERFERENCES WITH THE FREEDOM 
OF NAVIGATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2007). 
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the interception of a vessel that displayed no flag or identifying markings.66 
These facts could justify boarding and inspection on grounds of suspected 
statelessness. Wendel argues, however, that the right to verify nationality in 
such cases cannot justify inspection of the hold or cargo, as the only relevant 
material will be the vessel’s papers.67 If the papers resolve the issue, no fur-
ther search should occur. This, in Wendel’s view, raises questions regarding 
the legality of continuing to conduct a search of the hold in cases such as the 
So San incident in which a vessel suspected of conveying Scud missiles from 
North Korea to Yemen bore no external markings of nationality, but at-
tempted to claim Cambodian nationality verbally.68 Setting aside the fact that 
the So San interdiction occurred with the consent of the ostensible flag State 
(which had authority under international law to authorize the search),69 Wen-
del’s general point is not unfair. We must return, however, to the text of 
Article 110(2), which states that “[i]f suspicion remains after the documents 
have been checked, [the boarding State] may proceed to a further examina-
tion.”70 The right of “further examination” appears to be a general one. Even 
if narrowly construed by reference to the original suspicion, as Wendel would 
have it, where inadequate papers have been presented and the relevant sus-
picion is one of statelessness, inspection of the hold may reveal information 
such as a main beam number capable of assisting in the vessel’s identifica-
tion.71 
To some, however, all of this is beside the point. The question at hand 
is not whether a VBSS operation can be conducted on a pretext (i.e., state-
lessness) in order to conduct a search with an ulterior motive. This would be 
open to an allegation of abuse of right (UNCLOS Article 300). Rather, the 
question is what can one do with information uncovered in the course of a 
legitimate VBSS operation that might be generally relevant to broader ques-
tions of maritime security, or indeed that might provide evidence of specific 
criminal conduct, going beyond the original suspicions giving rise to a right 
of boarding. I have argued elsewhere in this respect that “it is inconceivable 
                                                                                                                      
66. The following discussion draws on analysis in GUILFOYLE, supra note 56, at 327–28. 
67. WENDEL, supra note 65, at 51. 
68. GUILFOYLE, supra note 56, at 244–45. 
69. On the authority of a “presumptive flag State” verbally claimed by the master, see id. at  
96, 340. 
70. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 110(2). 
71. Id. at 328. One would have to concede that the introduction of uniform IMO ship iden-
tification numbers in 1987 may have reduced the necessity for hold searches. 
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that [Article 110] would prohibit a State from making use of knowledge of 
other illicit activities discovered or alerting the vessel’s flag State of such.”72 
Indeed, at least one treaty concerning maritime security, the 2005 Proto-
col73 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation,74 imposes such a duty on a boarding State 
granted flag State permission to board and inspect a vessel at sea.  
The Protocol details a range of terrorism offenses, suspicion of which 
might justify boarding and inspection of a vessel. Generally such a boarding 
by a “requesting party” may only follow a request for and receipt of flag State 
consent, unless the flag State has waived that requirement under the treaty.75 
For VBSS operations the Protocol provides: 
 
When evidence of conduct [prescribed under the Protocol] is found as the 
result of any boarding . . . the flag State may authorize the requesting Party 
to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board pending receipt of disposi-
tion instructions from the flag State. The requesting Party shall promptly 
inform the flag State of the results of a boarding, search, and detention 
conducted pursuant to this article. The requesting Party shall also promptly inform 
the flag State of the discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that is not subject to this 
Convention.76 
 
Admittedly, other than this text there seems to be relatively little positive 
law dealing with the question of whether wider use can be made of evidence 
of other illegal conduct discovered aboard. One could attempt to invoke the 
so-called Lotus presumption in support of the conclusion that wider use is 
permitted in order to argue that anything not expressly prohibited is, in fact, 
permitted. However, quite apart from the fact that current scholarship tends 
                                                                                                                      
72. Douglas Guilfoyle, Article 110, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: A COMMENTARY 754 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017). 
73. Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Nov. 1, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 [hereinafter SUA Pro-
tocol 2005]. 
74. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Nav-
igation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221. 
75. See SUA Protocol 2005, supra note 73, art. 8bis(5)(d), (e) (setting out provisions for 
deemed consent after the lapse of four hours from the request in certain circumstances or 
complete waiver of the consent requirement). 
76. Id. art. 8bis(6) (emphasis added). 
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to argue that this is not, in fact, what the Lotus case stands for,77 attempts to 
argue in such terms usually end up in an unproductive cul-de-sac. The prop-
osition, as usually stated, is too broad to be meaningfully applied and pre-
sumes international law to consist largely of prohibitions rather than positive 
or facilitative rules. The better question is whether there any identifiable ob-
ligations of international law that would be breached if one were to make 
wider use of information found during a VBSS operation. It is submitted 
that such obligations are in practice rather hard to find. One could attempt 
to argue that wider use of information discovered somehow violates the 
principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, but one would have to 
state the principle at a very high level of generality for that result to follow. 
As this author has argued elsewhere,78 the regulatory jurisdiction (i.e., 
prescriptive jurisdiction) is by no means completely exclusive and other 
States remain free to attach consequences to the actions of, for example, 
their nationals aboard foreign vessels on the high seas. At best, the principle 
of “exclusive” flag State jurisdiction confers a prima facie immunity from 
physical interference on the high seas (enforcement jurisdiction) subject to 
exceptions provided by UNCLOS, other treaties or flag State consent. The 
rule of exclusive flag State jurisdiction is thus heavily qualified, and is by its 
very nature derogable. This does not seem compatible with the idea that it 
contains by necessary inference an otherwise unstated blanket prohibition 
against wider use of information discovered aboard a vessel on the high seas 
subject to a legal VBSS operation. Indeed, one might argue that positive ob-
ligations upon States to cooperate to suppress various illicit activities at sea 
mitigates in favor of the sharing of information where possible. Such obliga-
tions of cooperation exist with regard to, inter alia, piracy,79 maritime drug 
smuggling,80 unauthorized high seas radio broadcasting,81 the enforcement 
                                                                                                                      
77. See Hugh Handeyside, The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat?, 29 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 71, 78–80 (2007); An Hertogen, Letting Lo-
tus Bloom, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 901 (2015); Douglas Guil-
foyle, SS Lotus, in LANDMARK CASES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cameron Miles & 
Eirik Bjorge eds., forthcoming 2017); OLE SPIERMANN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGU-
MENT IN THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 254 (2005); see also id. at 
106–07. 
78. Guilfoyle, supra note 72; see also GUILFOYLE, supra note 56, at 101. 
79. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 100. 
80. Id. art. 108(1). 
81. Id. art. 109(1). 
 
 
 
Maritime Law Enforcement Operations and Intelligence Vol. 93 
 
315 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of internationally agreed fisheries conservation measures82 and the preven-
tion of migrant smuggling by sea.83 
 
B. VBSS in Waters under National Jurisdiction 
 
There are numerous good studies of the practical limitations international 
law may place upon VBSS operations in waters under national jurisdiction.84 
In the present article, the summary is not intended to be more than indicative 
of these limitations.85 
The territorial sea of up to 12 nm is plainly a zone of sovereign jurisdic-
tion over which coastal States have law enforcement jurisdiction, subject to 
innocent passage. What this means in practice has been debated. Some see 
innocent passage as conferring an absolute immunity from VBSS, unless 
“non-innocence” is made out on one of the specified grounds.86 Others have 
long pointed to the ambiguity of UNCLOS and the Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea on this point. Both conventions proclaim that a coastal 
State “should not” exercise criminal jurisdiction over “a foreign ship passing 
through the territorial sea” unless one of the categories of non-innocent pas-
sage are made out.87 However, should not is generally exhortatory language to 
be contrasted with a mandatory shall not. Churchill and Lowe see the provi-
sion as codifying usage: coastal States ordinarily restricted any exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction within territorial waters to a limited and generally 
                                                                                                                      
82. Id. art. 20(1). See also Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United  
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conserva-
tion and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for 
signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3. 
83. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 7, opened for signature 
Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507. 
84. See especially Kraska, supra note 59. 
85. Ships bound inward to port pose few jurisdictional problems, as conditions of entry to 
port may be imposed and enforced, including submitting to inspection or providing infor-
mation ahead of arrival. This analysis concerns vessels that do not enter a port of the 
coastal State. 
86. Namely, under Article 21(1) of UNCLOS: 
(a) [I]f the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if the crime is of a kind 
to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (c) if the assis-
tance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship . . .; or (d) if . . . 
necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 21(1). 
87. Id., art. 27; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 19, Apr. 29,  
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
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accepted set of grounds.88 Views differed as to whether that practice evi-
denced a restriction on powers of enforcement in the territorial sea ( i.e., a 
limitation upon sovereignty) or simply evidenced comity (i.e., plenary sover-
eignty, usually exercised with restraint).89 The debate is far from resolved, 
but the only clear prohibitions on law enforcement in the territorial sea con-
cern sovereign immune vessels and crimes “committed before the ship en-
tered the territorial sea” where the vessel in question is simply passing 
through the territorial sea without entering internal waters.90 
Conversely, the extent of law enforcement power in the contiguous zone 
may provide less authority than commonly thought to conduct VBSS oper-
ations. Within a contiguous zone (extending up to a further 12 nm seaward 
from the territorial sea), “states have limited powers” under UNCLOS Arti-
cle 33 to enforce “customs, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws.”91 UN-
CLOS allows coastal States only to exercise “control” (not sovereignty or 
jurisdiction) either to prevent infringement of the specified laws within the 
State’s territory or territorial sea or to punish acts already committed within 
its territory or territorial sea.92 Shearer argues that the connotations of con-
trol limit preventive enforcement action to “inspections and warnings ,” ra-
ther than arresting vessels.93 Some authorities, and in particular U.S. com-
mentators, treat Article 33 as allowing plenary criminal law enforcement for 
violations of the specified subject matters up to the outer limit of the zone.94 
This approach fails to give separate meanings to “prevent” and “punish.” 
The power to “punish” is conditioned upon criminal acts having occurred 
within a State’s territory or territorial sea.95 By analogy with the doctrine of 
hot pursuit, this appears to be an express extension of an otherwise imper-
missible jurisdiction. The condition limiting the exercise of jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                      
88. R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 95–99 (3d ed. 1999). 
89. Id. 
90. UNCLOS, supra note 37, arts. 27(5), 30–33. On the challenge of sovereign immune 
vessels that violate coastal State law in the territorial sea, see James Kraska, Putting Your Head 
in the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters , 54 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 164 (2015). 
91. Ivan Shearer, Problems of  Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement against  Delinquent Vessels, 35 IN-
TERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 320, 330 (1986). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 30, 49 (AM. LAW INST. 
1987); J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE 
MARITIME CLAIMS 481 (2d ed. 1996). 
95. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 33(1)(b). 
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“punish” would be redundant if relevant criminal laws were continuously 
enforceable up to the outer limit of the zone. The claim, for example, that 
“if the U.S. Intelligence Community levies terrorism threat reporting [i.e., the 
vessel is allegedly carrying terrorism-related material or personnel] against a 
ship anywhere within 24 nautical miles of the United States coast, it would 
be subject to United States jurisdiction”96 is absurd unless the facts of the 
case disclose a close link to a customs or immigration violation that has ac-
tually occurred. If such a violation is merely threatened, permissible measures 
may be constrained to visit and inspection. 
Finally, in the 200 nm EEZ, coastal States enjoy a limited bundle of sov-
ereign rights and subject matter jurisdiction. They have “sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natu-
ral resources, whether living or non-living . . . and with regard to other ac-
tivities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone .”97 Under 
this jurisdiction, the coastal State may also conduct activities pertaining to 
“artificial islands, installations and structures,” marine scientific research and 
“the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”98 In exercising 
its sovereign rights the coastal State may “take such measures, including 
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings” as are necessary to en-
force its laws with respect to those rights.99 Curiously, there are no express 
enforcement provisions in UNCLOS regarding “artificia l structures and ma-
rine scientific research,”100 but it is not questioned that, for example, a State’s 
criminal law may in principle extend to vessels that violate laws applicable in 
a safety zone around an artificial structure.101 In protecting the marine envi-
ronment, the coastal State enjoys power to regulate dumping under Article 
211(5), to conduct boarding and inspection of vessels causing or threatening 
“significant pollution of the marine environment” and to arrest and institute 
proceedings against vessels in pollution incidents that on “clear objective 
evidence” have caused “major damage or threat of major damage” under 
Articles 220(5) and 220(6).102 
                                                                                                                      
96. Thomas M. Brown, For the “Round and Top of  Sovereignty”: Boarding Foreign Vessels at Sea on 
Terror-Related Intelligence Tips, 59 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 63, 77 (2010). 
97. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 56(1)(a). 
98. Id. art 56(1)(b). 
99. Id. art. 73(1). 
100. Shearer, supra note 91, at 335. 
101. See, e.g ., Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2014), http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/21. 
102. Such jurisdiction being concurrent with that of the flag State. See also Shearer, supra note 
91, at 335. 
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As regards both the contiguous zone and EEZ, it would be an abuse of 
right to use such a power of inspection intentionally to gain intelligence not 
related to the subject matters over which rights or jurisdiction have been 
granted to a coastal State; however, wider use of any information discovered 
in the course of such a boarding should be permitted for the reasons dis-
cussed above in relation to the high seas. Thus, it is hard to see what signif-
icant restrictions international law might place upon the use a coastal State 
could make of law enforcement intelligence gleaned through a lawful VBSS 
operation in waters under national jurisdiction. One question might be 
whether VBSS operations can be conducted in international straits subject 
to the regime of transit passage, under which vessels enjoying such a right 
“shall not be impeded.”103 There is, however, not space to consider this point 
further in the present article.104 
 
V. PRACTICAL MEASURES 
 
What, practically speaking, follows from this analysis? Some observations are 
straightforward. If the aim of many maritime security operations is a suc-
cessful prosecution, then navies and other maritime security agencies must 
be trained in more than basic boarding and inspection techniques. As Son-
nenberg notes: “The ability to conduct inquiries, proper searches, and intel-
ligence collection is just as important [as tactical techniques and procedures], 
if not more so, because they are the core tasks of a boarding that will deter-
mine the outcome.”105 Indeed, one U.S. study has concluded that “the lack 
of specialized training for VBSS missions is a major deficiency in maritime 
security operations.”106 The mission needs to determine the capabilities that 
are required, rather than agency capabilities driving the types of mission that 
are undertaken. And, as Tomasulo notes, maritime threat response cases may 
be “planned” or “unplanned.” 
 
Planned responses originate as a result of actionable intelligence. A planned 
response provides time for the various [stakeholder] U.S. Government 
agencies . . . to deliberate and select the appropriate mix of resources to 
achieve the desired outcome in response to a particular threat. The type of 
                                                                                                                      
103. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 38(1). 
104. See Shearer, supra note 91, at 331–32, for a consideration of this issue. 
105. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 71. 
106. Id. at 71–72. 
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capability employed is based on the level of the threat and the desired out-
come.107 
 
The threat that will be represented by “an armed terrorist on a vessel that is 
expected to be non-compliant” may require Navy SEALs.108 However, if the 
desired outcome involves “criminal prosecution,” then coast guard special-
ized boarding teams will need to be involved. Some cases may require a mix 
of capabilities.109 Thus, it is increasingly important for navies, as well as civil-
ian maritime agencies, to have some appreciation of law enforcement skills, 
to include minimal use of force in order to reduce disruption to society; the 
knowledge and ability to conduct effective and legal searches, to piece to-
gether case packages and to understand the difference between evidence and 
intelligence.110 
The issue becomes only more acute in multinational maritime security 
operations, such as counter-narcotics and counter-piracy operations, where 
the prosecuting State may not be the same entity as the boarding State. In 
the counter-piracy context, it has been noted that “law enforcement agents 
are generally trained to collect and preserve evidence in accordance with their 
own criminal procedure requirements. But what is good evidence for a 
Dutch court may not necessarily be good evidence for a Kenyan court.”111 
Indeed, evidentiary issues can present challenges throughout multilateral 
operations. For example, the value of otherwise actionable evidence may be 
lost, not because it is somehow considered tainted, but, due to “the formal 
requirements of admissibility” in a given legal system. 112 Thus, while Kenya 
has been willing since 2006 to conduct numerous trials of Somali piracy sus-
pects captured by foreign navies patrolling the Gulf of Aden, its courts faced 
difficulties in accepting “the admissibility of photographs that were taken by 
a person not previously authorised by the Attorney-General.”113 In the end, 
international cooperation required “substantive changes in laws or policy” 
                                                                                                                      
107. Tomasulo, supra note 32, at 34. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 124. 
111. Rob McLaughlin & Tamsin Phillipa Paige, The Role Of Information Sharing In Counter-
Piracy In The Horn Of Africa Region: A Model For Transnational Criminal Enforcement Operations, 
12 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 82, 92 (2016). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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by a number of States conducting either counter-piracy patrols or trials of 
captured piracy suspects.114 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This article explored the question of intelligence collection and distribution 
to support maritime law enforcement operations in the context of modern 
concerns about maritime security more broadly. This line of inquiry required 
consideration of intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing/coordinated 
action in each of two dimensions. Relevant intelligence for law enforcement 
may consist either of general awareness of the maritime domain or to specific 
evidence supporting a criminal prosecution. That is, the deployment of finite 
law enforcement assets requires knowledge of which vessels are engaged in 
what activities, and where they are located. Regarding the second dimension 
of law enforcement intelligence gathering, as navies are increasingly involved 
in maritime security operations that may shade over into law enforcement, 
greater training and coordination may be required such that naval personnel 
can act to support law enforcement operations without compromising the 
collection of admissible evidence. 
This issue raises the question of coordinated action and sharing intelli-
gence either between agencies or between governments. Irrespective of 
which coastal State is being discussed, maritime security operations will re-
quire the coordination of a variety of government departments and agencies. 
Thus, there will be significant questions of horizontal coordination within 
any government conducting maritime security or law enforcement opera-
tions. Additionally, there may be significant questions of coordination be-
tween partner States engaged in suppression of such activities as drug smug-
gling or piracy. 
A number of relevant legal questions arising have been considered. The 
least legally complex question, though perhaps one of the more practically 
complex, is the interface between partner States in handing over admissible 
evidence packages from an interdicting or boarding State to prosecuting au-
thorities in a different State. While a certain amount of practical training and 
coordination may assist in such cases, in some there will simply be no alter-
native to revisions to domestic legislation if successful prosecutions are to 
occur. Similar challenges may arise within a coastal State if navies become 
involved in maritime law enforcement. 
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A number of the legal difficulties in achieving maritime domain aware-
ness have also been discussed. While the IMO ’s LRIT regulation achieves a 
greater degree of coordinated information sharing among flag States and 
coastal States that could support the achievement of better MDA, significant 
gaps in the LRIT regime remain, especially as regards small craft. Such gaps 
may not be entirely possible to close at the level of national action either. As 
with any intelligence exercise, while one can seek better information, perfect 
information is simply not possible. 
Finally, some attention has been given to the specific legal question of 
what can be done with intelligence gathered in the course of a VBSS opera-
tion conducted for one purpose, but which results in evidence of an unre-
lated crime being uncovered. Can such evidence be retained and used for 
other purposes by the boarding State or shared with other States, including 
the flag State? I have referred to this as the question of “wider use.” Com-
mentators tend to suggest that VBSS may only be conducted for quite limited 
purposes, and the action taken must not exceed what the original suspicion 
giving rise to the right of boarding would require. Even if one takes so nar-
row a view, the conclusion suggested here is that nothing in the law of the 
sea prohibits wider use being made of evidence uncovered of crimes other 
than that of which the vessel was originally suspected. Indeed, coming to a 
contrary conclusion could undermine various duties upon States to cooper-
ate in the suppression of maritime crime. The only relevant limitation would 
be that deliberately boarding and searching a vessel under color of a suspi-
cion not actually held with the purpose of gathering information about un-
related offenses would likely constitute an abuse of right. 
